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Formalism, Realism, and the War on Drugs·

David D. Colet
Upon graduation, one of my law school classmates became an Assistant
United States Attorney (AU SA) in a major city in the Northeast, where he
found himself prosecuting federal drug cases. Like Supreme Court Justice
Clarence Thomas reportedly reacted upon seeing a man taken into custody, my
friend had a "there but for the grace of God go I" reaction. I My friend is an
ambitious, smart white man who grew up in the Midwest, and worked hard to
get where he is today. In his eyes, but for their race and class, the young men
he was prosecuting were strikingly similar to himself. They were the
entrepreneurs of their community-the ones with ambition, drive, and a
willingness to work hard. But the way to get ahead in their community was not
to do well on exams, join the debate team, and go to an exclusive Ivy League
college, but rather to deal drugs, earn lots of money, and buy a fancy car. My
friend felt that had he grown up where these defendants grew up, he too might
well have been involved in the drug trade, and might well have found himself
on the other side of the courtroom.
Like most wars, the war on drugs has had a devastatingly disparate impact
on minorities and the poor. Even though illegal drug use appears to be an equal
opportunity offense, blacks and the poor are disproportionately arrested,
• This article is based upon a speech delivered on April 12,2001 as part of the Donahue Lecture Series.
The Donahue Lecture Series is a program instituted by the Suffolk University Law Review to commemorate the
Honorable Frank J. Donahue, former faculty member, trustee, and treasurer of Suffolk University. The Lecture
Series serves as a tribute to Judge Donahue's accomplishments in encouraging academic excellence at Suffolk
University Law School. Each lecture is designed to address contemporary legal issues and expose the Suffolk
University community to outstanding authorities in various fields of law.
t Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; B.A., Yale University; J.D., Yale Law
School.
1. The Thomas Hearings: Excerpts/rom the Senate's Hearings on the Thomas Nomination, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 13, 1991, at AI8 (quoting Clarence Thomas). Thomas stated that when he looks out the window from his
courthouse office and sees criminal defendants being bused into court, "I say to myself almost every day, but
for the grace of God there go J." Jd.
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convicted, and incarcerated for drug offenses. This essay argues that the war
on drugs is sustainable only because of that disparity, and that society's
response to drugs would be very different if we were willing to take full
account of, and responsibility for, that disparity. We can only afford to be as
tough on drugs as we are because those who are sent away for years of their
lives for relatively minor roles in the drug trade are overwhelmingly minorities.
One of the ways our legal system has avoided confronting this ugly reality is
through a commitment to legal formalism. Legal formalism allows us to ignore
the social determinants that my AUSA friend saw every day as he prosecuted
federal drug cases. As my colleague Professor Michael Seidman has
suggested, legal formalism, which has been effectively critiqued and displaced
by legal realism in many other areas of law, continues to exercise considerable
influence over the way we think about criminallaw.z This formalist approach,
in my view, has strongly affected the way we approach the drug problem. One
consequence is that we continue to pursue an increasingly futile war on drugs
and refuse to see the issue in its broader, realist dimension. A little realism on
the subject of drugs, I suggest, would go a long way.
There is much to be said for formalism in the criminal law. Formalism, with
its commitment to fair procedures, clear rules, and restricted discretion, is a
necessary part of any fair system of criminal law. The sanctions involved in
the criminal system are too severe to permit them to be allocated in an openended discretionary or regulatory manner. The criminal law's commitment to
formalism is thus not a fault, but a strength. Discretionary regulatory schemes
too often invite subjective judgments susceptible to abuse, prejudice, and
favoritism. Formalist rules, by contrast, are built on the promise of treating
likes alike. Precisely for this reason, however, we ought to reconsider whether
the criminal approach makes sense when there is substantial evidence that the
commitment to equality has been seriously compromised.
Our dual
commitments to equality and to the reduction of the human damage that drug
abuse inflicts suggest that we should reduce our reliance on the criminal justice
system. Alternative approaches, such as treatment and rehabilitation, promise
to be both more effective and more fair.
I. REALISM AND THE CRIMINAL LAW
In an important and perceptive article, Professor Michael Seidman argues

that the criminal law has in significant respects remained immune from the
legal realist revolution in American law. 3 The criminal law rests on core
assumptions that fit the formalist worldview much more comfortably than the
2. See generally Louis Michael Seidman, Points of Intersection: Discontinuities at the Junction of
Criminal Law and the Regulatory State, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 97 (1996).
3. Id. at 97-98 (stating criminal law remains formalist in a legal environment dominated by realism).
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realist worldview. One cornerstone of the criminal justice system, for example,
is free will and individual responsibility. It is legitimate for the state to lock up
human beings only because they are said to be blameworthy, or responsible for
their bad acts. To be blameworthy, one must act with free will. If one's
actions are not the product of free will, one cannot be held responsible for
them, and punishment is inappropriate. The criminal law's focus on individual
responsibility, Seidman argues, reflects a formalist conception that has long
been considered outmoded in other areas of law, where legal realist insights
have revealed the shortcomings of the formalist approach.
Consider, for example, Lochner v. New York,4 a familiar example of legal
formalism and its faults. In Lochner, the Supreme Court sustained a
substantive due process challenge to a law that set maximum hours for bakers,
reasoning that the law infringed upon the liberty of contract. The Court
concluded that the law was an attempt to regulate labor relations between
bakery owners and employees, and that it impermissibly interfered with the
parties' right to contract. In the Court's view, the "liberty" protected by the due
process clause rendered suspect any regulation of labor relations, and in
particular any attempt to redistribute economic bargaining power. This view in
tum was predicated on the formalist assumption that the right to contract was a
pre-political natural right, from which any departure through "regulation"
required a compelling justification.
The realist critique of Lochner maintains that there is no such thing as a prepolitical freedom of contract. s Contractual relationships reflect disparities in
bargaining power that are themselves constructed, affected, and maintained by
the law of contracts. These disparities in bargaining power substantially reduce
the reality of free choice for many in contractual negotiations. According to
this view, the Court's mistake in Lochner was to accept the market status quo
and the common law as a neutral "state of nature" baseline. Realists contended
that the status quo and the common law were neither natural nor neutral, but
were determined by legal rules and social choices that privileged some while
disadvantaging others. Bakers, the realists argued, simply did not have the
same freedom to contract as owners. From this perspective, contractual
relations are already constructed by legal regulation, and thus it is legitimate to
structure regulations for the common good, particularly for the purpose of
leveling the playing field and reducing labor exploitation.
The Supreme Court has long since repudiated Lochner. As Professor
Bernard Siegan has put it, Lochner" is one of the most condemned cases in

4.

198 U.S. 45 (1905).

5. See generally Robert Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Noncoercive State, 38 POL.
SCIENCE Q. 470 (1923) (arguing bargaining power is function of legal rules and not part of pre-existing natural
order).
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United States history and has been used to symbolize judicial dereliction and
abuse.,,6 There are multiple reasons for the demise of the Lochner regime, one
of which was undoubtedly the rise of legal realism and its critique of legal
formalism. It is no longer acceptable to argue that the law cannot have
redistributive consequences because there is no such thing as law without
distributive consequences. This follows logically from the realization that the
status quo is constructed by law. Today, unlike in the days of Lochner,
government regulation of markets is seen as inevitable. We hang on Federal
Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan's interest rate announcements, but we do
not question the government's role in setting that rate. Whereas formalists
assumed autonomous individuals exercising free will in a state of nature,
realists hold a more deterministic view of world, seeing the law as a set of
incentives to regulate social relationships, to prevent problems, and to advance
social welfare. In Professor Seidman's terms, realists see the law as regulatory
rather than natural. 7
This realist revolution has largely bypassed the criminal law, which has
remained formalist at its core. The criminal law's focus on individual
responsibility and blameworthiness assumes that the status quo is neutral, and
that individuals' choices are the product of free will and not socially
determined.
There are good reasons for the criminal law's formalist assumptions. For
one thing, as Seidman acknowledges, the assumption of free will reflects how
most of us experience the world. 8 Even those who believe in a strong form of
material or social determinism tend to act as if they exercise some sort of free
will in their daily lives; indeed, acting in the world would probably be
impossible without such an assumption. Further, concepts of individual
responsibility and free will have a valuable impact on social behavior. These
concepts instill each of us with a sense of responsibility for our own fate.
Indeed, to act freely is central to our conception of human dignity.
At the same time, formalist commitments are important because they reduce
reliance on discretion. The criminal sanction is the most severe that a
democratic society can impose on its citizens. The severity of the sanction
demands that it be applied with scrupulous neutrality. Thus, while raceconscious affIrmative action in the distribution of job opportunities or college
admissions is widely practiced (and debated), race-conscious decision making
in the criminal setting is widely viewed as unacceptable, even if undertaken to
6. BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 23 (1980).
7. Seidman, supra note 2, at 102 (arguing regulatory approach flows from realist approach). Seidman
further asserts that a rejection of the concept of natural rights has allowed the law to attempt to redistribute
resources and to strive to reach optimal social outcomes. Id.
8. Seidman, supra note 2, at 162 (acknowledging even those who espouse theory of social determinism
live as though making free choices).
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benefit minorities. The heightened significance of equality in the criminal
justice system supports the criminal law's commitment to fonnalist rules.
Despite its surface commitment to fonnalist rules, however, the
administration of the criminal law is also shot through with discretion. Police
officers exercise discretion in determining where to patrol, whom to question
and stop, whether to arrest, and what charges to propose. Prosecutorial
discretion is also notoriously wide-ranging, as prosecutors wield authority to
drop or add charges to an indictment, and to decide whether to negotiate plea
agreements. Juries, which reach their decisions in the black box of the jury
room, exercise largely invisible and unreviewable discretion. Judges wield
discretion in their pretrial orders, evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, and
sentencing decisions. Moreover, the criminal justice system depends upon
these discretionary interstices, and would likely be unworkable without them. 9
The law insists, however, that all of these discretionary decisions be made in
a formally colorblind fashion. If police, prosecutors, juries or judges rely on
race to guide their discretion, whether to aid or to harm a minority group, their
decisions are by definition illegitimate and unconstitutional. Thus, while the
criminal law depends upon the exercise of discretion, it insists that such
discretion be exercised in keeping with the criminal law's fonnal commitment
to equality.
At the same time, we recognize that in the real world, all persons do not
have the same ability to act autonomously. "Free will" is a relative concept,
and social circumstances significantly affect and determine behavior. The
choices facing a young black man in the ghetto of Camden, New Jersey are
starkly different from the choices that my AUSA friend faced growing up in a
Midwest suburb. Yet we steadfastly refuse to consider that reality in the
criminal justice system. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines, for example,
expressly forbid any consideration of race or socioeconomic status in
sentencing. IO As a constitutional matter, deciding whether to prosecute on the
basis of race or socioeconomic status is clearly impermissible. II In criminal
law, formal colorblindness is the rule, and probably should be.
Reality, however, rarely conforms to the rule. Consider the following facts.
A 2000 study of 2800 homicide cases randomly selected from thirty-three
urban counties found that the race and sex of the victim had a substantial effect
on homicide sentences, even after controlling for other variables, such as

9. See David Cole, Whol·s Criminology GOI 10 Do Wilh II?, 48 STAN. L REv. 1605, 1617 (1996)
(recognizing discretionary determinations integral to administration of criminal law).
10. u.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANuAL §§ 5H1.I0, 5K2.12 (2001) (stating race, sex, national origin
and economic status irrelevant to determination of sentence).
11. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (holding selective prosecution based on race or national
origin unconstitutional).
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criminal history, type of offense, and details of the crime. 12 These disparities
held true even for vehicular homicides, in which victims are almost always
random and blameless. All other variables being equal, a drunk driver who
kills a woman will receive a sentence more than 50% longer than one who kills
a man, and a driver who kills a black victim will receive a sentence 50% shorter
than one who kills a white victim. The system seems to "value" the lives of
white female victims more highly than any others.
These findings are consistent with Professor David Baldus's famous study of
the Georgia death penalty.13 Baldus conducted a detailed statistical analysis of
more than 2,000 murder cases in Georgia in the 1970s. He found that after
controlling for thirty-nine nonracial variables that might explain apparent racial
disparities, those charged with killing white victims were 4.3 times more likely
to receive the death penalty than those who killed black victims. 14 Thus, the
race of one's victim was a significant determinant in whether a murderer in
Georgia received a sentence of life imprisonment or of death. Other studies of
the death penalty have found similar race-of-victim disparities. In 1990, the
General Accounting Office reviewed twenty-eight studies concerning race and
the death penalty, and discovered that 82% of them found the race of the victim
to be a significant factor in whether a defendant received the death penalty. 15
A 1998 study by George Bridges and Sara Steen found that juvenile
caseworkers were much more likely to attribute delinquent behavior to innate
characteristics when committed by black youth than when committed by white
youth. 16 The caseworkers were more likely to explain white youth's behavior
as a result of their social environment, and more likely to label minority youth
as "bad kids." These attributions in tum affect predictions of future
dangerousness and sentencing of juvenile offenders, contributing to harsher
treatment for black youth. These findings suggest that while colorblindness
may be the formal rule of the criminal justice system, the reality is that race
matters. 17 As the following section illustrates, nowhere is this more true than in
12. EDWARD L GLAESER & BRUCE SACERDOTE, THE DETERMINANTS OF PUNISHMENT: DETERRENCE,
INCAPACITATION AND VENGEANCE I, 13-14 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7676, 2000).
13. DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS 314-16 (1990).
14. [d. at 315 (explaining study used cross-tabular analysis requiring large sample size); see also
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286 (1987) (stating Baldus study of over 2,000 murder cases indicates
disparity based on race of victim). The McCleskey Court found that the Baldus study did not establish an equal
protection violation, because it did not establish that McCleskey's particular death penalty was imposed
because of race. [d. at 292 n.7.
15. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERN OF
RACIAL DISPARITIES 5-6 (1990) (stating synthesis of studies indicate racial disparities in capital sentencing).
16. See generally George S. Bridges & Sara Steen, Racial Disparities in Official Assessments ofJuvenile
Offenders: Attributional Stereotypes as Mediating Mechanisms, 63 AM. Soc. REv. 554 (1998).
17. See generally DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM (1999); see also generally MARc MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE (1999) (tracing racial
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the war on drugs.
II. REALISM AND THE WAR ON DRUGS

The best evidence suggests that the use of illegal drugs is evenly distributed
by race. The leading indicator of drug use is an annual anonymous household
survey conducted by the United States Public Health Service. This self-report
study indicates that drug use is roughly proportionate across the racial
spectrum. In 2000, 6.4% of whites and of blacks, and 5.3% of Hispanics
reported using illicit drugs. IS
Similar self-reporting data on drug distribution does not exist. Some suggest
that minorities dominate the drug distribution trade, pointing anecdotally to
inner-city drug markets run by minorities and frequented by white suburban
buyers. On the other hand, a 1997 Justice Department study found that most
users report getting their drugs from dealers of the same race, so the
demographics of distribution likely reflect the demographics of drug use. 19
Racial profiling studies also support the proposition that drug use is an equal
opportunity offense. These studies, mandated by many jurisdictions across the
country in recent years, track the racial patterns of stops and searches on the
nation's roads and sidewalks and at the borders. Profiling stops and searches
are primarily designed to find contraband, mostly drugs. Studies consistently
show that police officers disproportionately stop and search African-Americans
and Hispanics. 20 The consistency of this finding across multiple jurisdictions
and officers suggests that profiling is not the work of a few rogue racist police
officers, but the result of a broadly shared assumption that blacks and Hispanics
are more likely to be carrying drugs or other contraband than whites.
The actual results of the searches refute this assumption. If it were true that
blacks and Hispanics were more likely to be carrying drugs or contraband, one
would expect the police to find more contraband on the blacks and Hispanics
they stop and search than on the whites they stop and search. Yet reported "hit
rates"-the proportion of searches that actually reveal contraband-are as high
or higher for whites as for minorities. In Maryland, 73% of drivers the police
stopped and searched on 1-95 were black, yet equal percentages of whites and
blacks searched had contraband. 21 In New Jersey, where police have admitted

politics and disparities in exponential rise in incarceration in United Slates from 1970s to present).
18. Substance Abuse and Menial Health Services Administration, Summary of Findings From the 2000
National Household Survey on Drug Abuse (200 I), at http://www.samhsa.gov/oaslNHSDAI2kNHSDN
chapter2.htm (last visited June 22, 2002).
19. K. JACK RILEY, CRACK, POWDER COCAINE, AND HEROIN: DRUG PURCHASE AND USE PATTERNS IN
SIX U.S. CITIES I (National Institute of Justice, 1997).
20. See DAVID HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT WORK 49-72 (2002)
(collecting studies of racial profiling).
21. David Cole & John Lamberth, The Fallacy of Racial Profiling, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2001, at 013
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to racial profiling, 10.5% of whites and 13.5% of blacks were found carrying
22
contraband. Based on data from January 1998 to March 1999, the New York
Attorney General reported that while New York City police were 6 times more
likely to stop and frisk blacks than whites, and four times more likely to stop
and frisk Latinos than whites, their hit rates were 12.6% for whites, to.5% for
blacks, and 11.3% for Latinos. 23 And while 43% of those searched by United
States Customs in Fiscal Year 1998 were minorities, only 6.7% of whites, 6.3%
of blacks, and 2.8% of Latinos had contraband. 24 These fmdings suggest that,
contrary to the assumption that drives racial profiling, whites are just as likely
as blacks to be carrying drugs or other contraband.
The racial profiling studies also make clear that the war on drugs has largely
been a war on minorities. It is, after all, drug enforcement that motivates most
racial profiling. The Drug Enforcement Agency's Operation Pipeline, which
trained state police in drug enforcement on the highways, specifically trained
officers in racial profiling. 25 People carrying drugs do not look very different
from people carrying school supplies or groceries, and thus police often resort
to racial stereotypes in selecting whom to approach and stop, and specifically
rely on the stereotype that minorities are more likely to be carrying drugs than
are whites.
The disproportionate targeting of minorities does not stop on the nation's
highways, but extends to general drug arrest and incarceration rates. For
example, while blacks represent only 14-15% of drug users, in 1995 they were
35% of those arrested for drug possession, 55% of those convicted for drug
possession, and 74% of those sentenced to prison for drug possession?6
Although African-Americans committed drug crimes in rough proportion to
their representation in the population at large, they were sentenced at a rate 5 to
6 times their representation in the population. Local statistics tell much the
same story. In Columbus, Ohio, although black males compose less than 11 %

(reporting hit rates on 1-95 in Maryland refute assumption that minorities more likely to have drugs); John
Lamberth
&
American Civil
Liberties Union,
Report of John Lamberth. Ph.D., at
http://www.aclu.orglcourtllamberth.html (last visited June 22, 2002); Paul Valentine, AeLU Files Suit Against
Md. Police: Group Says Blacks Targeted Along 1-95, WASH. POST, Jun. 5, 1998, at BI (analyzing Maryland
State Police stop and search records for first nine months of 1995).
22. PETER VERNIERO & PAUL ZOUBEK, INTERIM REpORT OF THE STATE POUCE REVIEW TEAM
REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF RACIAL PROFILING 28 (1999), available at http://www.state.nj.usllpsl
intm_419.pdf (last visited June 22, 2002).
23. Office of N.Y. State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, "Stop and Frisk" Report, ch. 5, part 1 (2000) at
http://www.oag.state.ny.uslpressireportsistop_frisklch5Jlarll.html (last visited June 22, 2002) (reporting
statistical patterns regarding race in New York law enforcement).
24. U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE, PERSONAL SEARCHES OF AIR PASSENGERS RESULTS: POSITIVE AND
NEGATIVE, FISCAL YEAR 1998 6-8 (2000).
25. Harris, supra note 20, at 48-52 (detailing charges of use of racial factors in Operation Pipeline).
26. MARC MAUER & TRACY HUUNG, YOUNG BLACK AMERICANS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM:
FIVE YEARS LATER 12 (1995).

HeinOnline -- 35 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 248 2001

2001]

FORMALISM. REALISM. AND THE WAR ON DRUGS

249

of the population, they constitute about 90% of drug arrests. 27 In Minneapolis,
Minnesota, black males are arrested for drugs at a rate twenty times that of
white males. 28
The Supreme Court has permitted-and to some extent invited-these
29
disparities.
Drug law enforcement is extremely difficult to accomplish
without circumventing Fourth Amendment guarantees of freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures. This is largely because drug couriers are
difficult to identify and drug offenses are often victimless. Several doctrines
permit the police to evade the probable cause requirement in ways that facilitate
the search for drugs. For example, the Court permits "pretext stops," in which
the police use the pretext of a traffic violation to stop and search for drugs. 30 In
practice, this rule permits police to stop virtually anyone on the roads and
facilitates the use of racial profiling in choosing whom to stop because nearly
everyone who drives a car will likely violate some traffic regulation.
The Court's "consent search" doctrine also invites profiling. This doctrine
allows the police to search in the absence of any individualized suspicion as
long as they obtain "voluntary consent." The Court has refused to require the
police when seeking consent to inform citizens that they have the right to say
no and that exercising that right cannot be used against them. 3 ! The Court has
also declined to provide any protection against the use of "consent searches" in
the inherently coercive setting of a traffic stop.32 Consent searches have
become a particularly attractive tool for conducting searches for drugs without
probable cause because few people refuse consent when an officer asks for it
during a traffic stop. Significantly, profiling data suggest that racial disparities
in searches are much more acute than in stops themselves. 33
These doctrines are themselves partly attributable to the war on drugs.
Difficulty in identifying drug crimes, combined with the mandate to enforce

27. JEROME G. MIu.ER, SEARCH AND DESTROY: AFRICAN-AMERICAN MALES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 82 (1996).

28. Id.
29. Infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which Supreme Court expands rights of
officers to search despite conflicts with Fourth Amendment rights).
30. Whren v. United States, 517 U.s. 806,811-12 (1996) (holding that pretextual motivation of police
officer irrelevant to Fourth Amendment inquiry).
31. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 231-32 (1973) (finding no requirement that police advise
subject of search of right to refuse). The Court reasoned that requiring warnings would discourage consent and
thereby burden police investigations. Id.
32. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33,36-37 (1996) (refusing to require police to inform detainee he can
leave before conducting consent search in automobile stop).
33. See generally Report of John Lamberth, supra note 21 (black, Hispanic, or other racial minorities
made up 80.3% of the 823 motorists searched in Maryland study); Vemiero & Zoubek, supra note 22, at 27
(black or Hispanic motorists made up 77.2% of 1,193 searches in New Jersey study); see also U.S. Customs
Service, supra note 24 at 6-8 (reporting that blacks and Hispanics searched disproportionately more often than
whites).
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drug laws, has put substantial pressure on constitutional doctrine.
Consequently, the Court has developed several doctrinal "loopholes" at the
expense of constitutional rights by allowing the police to conduct searches for
34
drugs without probable cause that a person is carrying drugs. But by freeing
officers to act without objective indicia of individualized suspicion, such
doctrines effectively invite racially stereotyped profiling. 35
Racial disparities in the administration of the drug laws are reflected in
growing racial disparities in incarceration. The war on drugs has been a critical
factor in the explosion in incarceration rates in America over the past twentyfive years, and racial targeting has meant that minorities have made up most of
the increase in the incarcerated population.
From 1925 to 1975, the
incarceration rate in the United States was virtually flat, at about 100
incarcerated persons per 100,000 residents. 36 The rate was so steady for so
long that criminologists developed theories for why incarceration rates would
always remain constant. 37 Those theories are no longer seriously entertained,
however, because since 1975 the United States has experienced a nearly 400%
increase in the incarceration rate. 38 We now lead the world in per capita
incarceration, and boast an incarceration rate 5 times higher than that of the
next highest Western European nation. 39 From 1980 to 1993, drug offenders
made up three-quarters of the increase in the federal prison population. 40 Drug
offenders were 25% of the federal prison population in 1980, but 59% in
1996. 41 In the state prisons, drug offenders were 6% of the prison population in
1980, but 21% in 1996.42 Today, there are nearly half a million prisoners
34. See generally David A. Harris, Terry and the Fourth Amendment: Particularized Suspicion,
Categorical Judgments: Supreme Court Rhetoric Versus Lower Court Reality Under Terry v. Ohio, 72 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 975 (1998); David A. Harris, Factorsfor Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means
Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659 (1994); Gregory H. Williams, The Supreme Court and Broken Promises:
The Gradual but Continual Erosion of Terry v. Ohio, 34 How. L.J. 567 (1991); see also supra notes 30-32 and
accompanying text (discussing several cases in which Supreme Court relaxes Fourth Amendment
requirements).
35. See DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 27-55 (1999).
36. Mauer, RACE TO INCARCERATE, supra note 17, at 17, fig. 2-1 (showing per capita incarceration rate
ranging from 80 to 140 persons per 100,000 residents every year from 1925 to 1975).
37. See generally Alfred Blumstein & Jacqueline Cohen, A Theory of the Stability of Punishment, 64 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 198 (1973).
38. Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, table 6.26 (Ann L. Pastore & Kathleen Maguire, eds.,
2000), at http://www.albany.eduisourcebooklI995/pdf/t626.pdf(last visited June 22, 2002).
39. SENTENCING PROJECT, U.S. SURPASSES RUSSIA AS WORLD LEADER IN RATE OF INCARCERATION, at
hnp:llwww.sentencingproject.org/brieflpublO44.pdf (last visited June 22, 2002); see also MAUER, RACE TO
INCARCERATE, supra note 17, at 21-23 tbl. 2-1, fig. 2-3 (comparing incarceration rates of United States and
other nations).
40. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin, Prisoners in 1994, at 10, table 13 (1995).

41. Id.

42. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PuNISHMENT AND PREJUDICE: RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE WAR ON DRUGS
14 (2000).
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incarcerated for drug offenses. 43 This figure does not include the thousands of
inmates whose offenses are drug-related, meaning that they committed a crime
to raise money to pay the prices of drugs kept artificially high by the war on
drugs. Nor does it take into account those driven to violence and crime by
exposure to the criminal business of drug dealing and distribution, which would
not exist but for the war on drugs.
Racial minorities have borne the brunt of this incarceration boom. From
1970 to 1996, the proportion of blacks in prison increased by 25%, while the
proportion of blacks arrested for violent crimes dropped by 20%.44 From 1986
to 1991, the number of white drug offenders in state prisons increased by
110%, but the number of black offenders incarcerated grew by 465%.45
Among juveniles during the same time period, drug arrests of minorities
increased by 78%, while drug arrests of whites decreased by 34%.46 Today,
black males are admitted to state prison for drug offenses at thirteen times the
rate for white males. 47 In many states, the disparities are even worse. In
Maryland and Illinois, for example, blacks comprised 90% of those admitted to
prison for drug offenses in 1996. 48
Like the formalist "liberty of contract" protected in Lochner, the formalist
criminal justice response to drugs is subject to a realist critique: its formal
neutrality masks political choices that are anything but neutral. I do not suggest
that we should excuse harmful behavior because of social circumstances, and I
acknowledge that the drug trade has plagued many residents of inner-city
minority commumtIes.
But the disparities identified above in the
administration of drug law enforcement ought to prompt a reconsideration of
the application of the necessarily formal criminal justice model. As noted
above, I do not believe that the criminal justice model can easily accommodate
the realist critique-in the end, formal equality is indispensable in the
administration of criminal justice. But if that is the case, the stark disparities
described above ought to cause us to question whether the criminal justice
model, with its attendant formalism, is an appropriate response to the drug
problem. A more realist regulatory approach may be appropriate-one less
concerned with meting out sanctions in a formally neutral manner, and more
concerned with maximizing social welfare and public health by adopting
43. PHILLIP BEAITY, ET AL., POOR PRESCRIPTION: THE COSTS OF IMPRISONING DRUG OFFENDERS IN THE
UNITED STATES (lust. Pol'y Inst. 2000), at http://www.cjcj.orgldruglpp.html(last visited lune 22, 2002)
(detailing nwnber of drug-related incarcerations).
44. Michael Tonry, Crime and Punishment in America, in THE HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT I,
18 (Michael Tonry ed., 1998) (comparing admissions to federal and state prisons by race).
45. MARc MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, INTENDED AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: STATE
RACIAL DISPARITIES IN IMPRISONMENT 10 (March 1997).
46. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE STATE OF CRiMINALIUSTlCE II (Feb. 1993).
47. Punishment and Prejudice, supra note 42, at 2.
48. Punishment and Prejudice, supra note 42, at 17.
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measures that respond to the drug problem in less rigid, and quite possibly
more effective, ways.
III.

AN AL TERNATNE APPROACH TO DRUG REGULA nON

By all accounts, the war on drugs has been a failure. Although nearly half a
million people are locked up for drug crimes, drugs are cheaper, purer, and
more easily available than ever before. 49 It costs about $20,000 a year to
incarcerate someone,50 and studies consistently fmd that treatment and
prevention are far more cost-effective responses to drug abuse. In 1997, the
Rand Corporation reported that treatment is seven times more cost-effective
than incarceration in reducing drug consumption. 51 We spend billions of
dollars each year in an increasingly futile effort to interdict drug imports. 52
Further, the criminalization of drugs makes the drug trade more profitable,
creating the incentive and opportunity for substantial organized criminal
activity. 53 As one commentator wrote presciently in 1920, when the first laws
criminalizing drugs were adopted: "We had not realized that the moment
restrictive legislation made these drugs difficult to secure legitimately, the
drugs would also be made profitable to illicit traffickers.,,54 We have created
the conditions for criminals to make billions of dollars. Juan Garcia Abrego,
for example, a Mexican drug gang leader, is said to be worth $15 billion. 55
The most difficult cost of the war on drugs to measure is also the most
important-the cost to the legitimacy of the criminal justice system.
Legitimacy is the linchpin of a legal order. If people believe in the fairness and
legitimacy of a legal regime, they will obey the law without the need for
substantial enforcement; if they lose faith in the system, law enforcement will
need to resort to harsher and harsher measures. Two features of the war on
drugs in particular corrode legitimacy. The first is the reality and perception
that the system is unfair to minorities, subjecting them to much harsher

49. MICHAEL MAsSING, THE Fix 9 (1998) (declaring war on drugs has not alleviated problem).
50. BEATTY, supra note 43, at n.20.
51. JONATHAN P. CAULKINS, ET AL., MANDATORY MINIMUM DRUG SENTENCES: THROWING AWAY THE
KEy OR THE TAXPAYERS' MONEY? xvii-xviii (1997) (comparing effects of incarceration and treatment in
preventing drug use).
52. Massing, supra note 49, at 9; see also, MIKE GRAY, DRUG CRAZY: How WE GOT INTO THE MESS
AND How WE CAN GET OUT 145-52 (1998) (recognizing futility of drug interdiction). Gray notes that the
nation's annual supply of heroin could be imported in a single cargo container, that Los Angeles harbor alone
unloads 130,000 containers a month, and that Customs checks only about 400 of them. [d.
53. GRAY, supra note 52, at 18-21; see also generally MARK THORNTON, THE ECONOMICS OF
PROHIBITION (1991).
54. GRAY, supra note 52, at 53 (quoting Charles Terry, former city health officer of Jacksonville,
Florida).
55. See GRAY, supra note 52, at 50.
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treatment than whites. The second threat to legitimacy stems from the
corruption that the war on drugs itself breeds because of the sheer amount of
money involved. The corrupting power of the war on drugs is widespread in
Colombia and Mexico, but it is also evident in U.S. drug and border
enforcement. 57
For these reasons, many involved in enforcing the war on drugs have
acknowledged that we cannot "incarcerate ourselves out of' the drug
problem. 58 Yet our insistence on hewing to a criminal model as our principal
response to the drug problem makes the regulatory approach of prevention,
education, and treatment a neglected second cousin. Former President Bill
Clinton's drug czar, General Barry McCaffrey, repeatedly said that we cannot
wage a "war" on drugs, and that we must emphasize treatment and
prevention. 59 The Clinton administration, however, consistently devoted twothirds of its drug budget to criminal law enforcement and only one-third to
treatment, pursuing the same rough distribution that Presidents George Bush
and Ronald Reagan did before him. 60 As a result, there are more people
incarcerated for drug offenses than ever before, and treatment is less available.
In 1991, 25% of state prisoners and 16% of federal prisoners received drug
treatment; in 1997, with many more drug-related prisoners behind bars, only
10% of state prisoners and 9% of federal prisoners received drug treatment. 61
The racial disparities described above playa critical role in the persistence
of a formalist criminal model for responding to the drug problem. Imagine
what the politics of drugs and crime would look like if the figures were
reversed, and white males were 13 times more likely to be incarcerated for
drugs than blacks. Indeed, we need not leave it to our imagination. In the late
1960s and early 1970s, when white high school and college kids began
56. See COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 17, at 169-78 (detailing costs to legitimacy attributable to
racial double standards in the criminal justice system).
57. GRAY, supra note 52, at 119-33 (discussing violence and corruption in Columbia and Mexico as result
of war on drugs); see also James Stemgold, 3 of4 Officers Convicted in Police Corruption Case, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 16, 2000, at A20 (reporting on convictions arising from Rampart scandal in which a Los Angeles Police
Department Division allegedly stole drugs, fabricated evidence, and lied in court); Lou Cannon, One Bad Cop,
N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 1,2000, at 32 (describing Rampart scandal).
58. Mireya Navarro, Experimental Courts Are Using New Strategies to Blunt the Lure of Drugs, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 17, 1996, at A25. Barry McCaffrey, head of the National Drug Control Policy Office, stated
"What we're convinced doesn't work is to just arrest people, lock them up and throw them back on the street
the way you got them." [d.; see also Timothy Egan, War on Crack Retreats, Still Taking Prisoners, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb 28., 1999, at A I (quoting McCaffrey as stating "We have a failed social policy and it has to be reevaluated .... Otherwise, we're going to bankrupt ourselves. Because we can't incarcerate our way out of this
problem.") McCaffrey estimated that we could save $S billion per year were we to substitute treatment for
incarceration for more than a quarter million Americans now in prison. Id.
59. Supra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing McCaffrey's view of war on drugs).
60. See generally Massing, supra note 49.
61. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND TREATMENT, STATE AND FEDERAL
PRISONERS, 1997 \0 (I 999}.
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smoking marijuana in large numbers, the nation's response was not to seek
harsher sentences, mandatory minimums, and increased prison building.
Instead, every state in the nation reduced the penalties associated with
marijuana, with thirteen states essentially decriminalizing possession of small
amounts altogether. 62 Like the juvenile caseworkers in Brides and Steen's
study,63 the white majority appears ready to blame and criminalize when the
defendant is black, but to excuse and treat when the defendant is white.
IV. CONCLUSION

The war on drugs is an area where we desperately need more realism and
less formalism, more regulation and less criminalization. The criminal
response is not working. It is taxing our resources, distorting our constitutional
rights, and increasing the racial disparities that plague our criminal justice
system. Many involved in the war itself agree that our current approach is not
working. But the color of those we assume to be responsible for the illicit drug
trade has allowed us to maintain the criminal model and to avoid confronting
our own social responsibility for the problem.
There is, however, some reason for hope. Coerced treatment appears to be a
politically acceptable alternative to incarceration, at least with respect to
nonviolent drug offenders. Drug courts, which offer those arrested for
nonviolent drug crimes a program of intensive coerced treatment with regular
drug testing in lieu of a conviction and prison sentence, have multiplied in
recent years. In 1994, there were only twelve nationwide; today there are over
64
400 drug courts, with another 200 in the planning stages.
Initial studies have
found drug courts more effective and cheaper than incarceration. 65
Similarly, in recent years, voters in Arizona and California have adopted
referenda that require their states to provide treatment rather than incarceration
for nonviolent drug offenders. 66 Arizona's law, adopted in 1996, requires
62. See Cole, supra note 17, at 152-53.
63. See generally Bridges & Steen, supra note 16. Bridges and Steen found juvenile caseworkers were
far more likely to attribute criminal behavior to innate characteristics for black youth, and to poor environments
for white youth. Id. Such findings generally lead to much harsher treatment for black youth in the juvenile
court system. Id.
64. David Cole, Doing Time-In Rehab: Drug Courts Keep Addicts Out of Jail, The Nation, Sept. 20,
1999, at 20-21 (discussing new approach to dealing with nonviolent drug offenders).
65. Id.; see also generally Steven Blenko, The Challenges of Integrating Drug Treatment into the
Criminal Justice Process, 63 ALB. L. REv. 833 (2000); Steven Blenko, Research on Drug Courts: A Critical
Review, I NAT'L DRUG CT. INST. REv. 22, 24 (1998) (summarizing results from drug court evaluations).
66. See Drug Medicalization, Prevention, and Control Act of 1996, ARIz. REv. STAT. § 13-901.01-02
(2001) (requiring courts to suspend sentencing and impose probation); California Drug Program Begins,
Despite Los Angeles Skepticism, N.Y. TIMES, July 3,2001, at AIO (describing beginning of implementation of
Proposition 36, which requires treatment instead of jail for first- and second-time non-violent drug offenders);
Anna Gorman, Judges Say New Drug Law is Working, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2002, at Bl (reporting on
implementation of California's Proposition 36).
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judges in certain drug cases to suspend sentences and provide probation in
conjunction with treatment. The state estimated that the program saved over $2
million in incarceration costs in its fIrst year of implementation. 67 In 2000,
California voters adopted the Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act,
which similarly diverts nonviolent drug offenders from prison to treatment
programs. The California program took effect in July 2001, so it is too early to
assess its effectiveness. But the fact that both programs were adopted by
popular referenda suggests that there may be growing support for a public
health response to drugs as an alternative to the criminal response.
In addition, revelations of widespread racial proftling, combined with the
data showing that blacks and Latinos are no more likely than whites to be
carrying drugs or other contraband, have brought home to the public at large
one of the real costs of the war on drugs-unequal law enforcement based on
race. Although the terrorist attacks of September 11 th have complicated the
picture, before September 11 th a full 80% of the American people thought that
racial proftling was wrong. 68 Many states, the federal government, and
hundreds of cities and counties have adopted reporting requirements designed
to identify and eliminate racial proftling. There has been more progress on this
issue than on any other issue of inequality in criminal justice in the past twentyfIve years.
These developments suggest that at least some elements of the public are
beginning to pay more attention to both equality considerations and
effectiveness in the war on drugs, and are beginning to call for change in the
way that we have responded to drugs over the past twenty-fIve years. It is time
to abandon the formal approach of the criminal justice system and the stale
metaphor of a war on drugs. Formalism has its place in criminal justice, but the
drug problem deserves a more realist, and more realistic, public health
approach.

67. Drug Treatment and Education Fund Legislative Report, FY 1997-98, at \0 (1999), available at
http://www.supreme.state.az.uslasdldteftoday.pdf (last visited June 22, 2002) (reporting cost savings from
diverting persons from prison to probation).
68. Frank Newport, Racial Profiling Is Seen as Widespread, Particularly Among Young Black Men,
GALLUP POLL NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 9, 1999 (on file with author) (presenting result of race-based poll to
determine treatment by law enforcement).
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